PhD Student in Economics
University of Maryland
The Unintended Consequences of Teacher Merit-Based Selection: Evidence from Large-Scale Reform in Colombia
with Matias Busso, Juan Muñoz Morales, and Nolan Pope
Revision requested at Journal of Public Economics
Teacher quality is a key factor in improving student academic achievement. As such, educational policymakers strive to design systems to hire the most effective teachers. This paper examines the effects of a national policy reform in Colombia that established a merit-based teacher-hiring system intended to enhance teacher quality and improve student learning. Implemented in 2005 for all public schools, the policy ties teacher-hiring decisions to candidates' performance on an exam evaluating subject-specific knowledge and teaching aptitude. We find that though the policy sharply increased pre-college test scores of teachers, it also decreased the overall stock of teacher experience and led to sharp decreases in students' exam performance and educational attainment. Using a difference-in-differences strategy to compare the outcomes of students from public and private schools over two decades, we show that the hiring reform decreased students' performance on high school exit exams by 8 percent of a standard deviation, and reduced the likelihood that students enroll in and graduate from college by more than 10 percent. The results underscore that relying exclusively on specific ex ante measures of teacher quality to screen candidates may unintentionally reduce students' learning gains.
Signaling Specific Skills and the Labor Market of College Graduates
with Matias Busso and Juan Muñoz Morales
Submitted
We study how signaling skills that are specific to college majors affect labor market outcomes of college graduates. We rely on census-like data and a regression discontinuity design to study the impacts of a well-known award given to top performers on a mandatory nationwide exam in Colombia. The award allows students to signal their high level of specific skills when searching for a job. These students earn 7 to 12 percent more than otherwise identical students lacking the signal. This positive return persists five years after graduation. The signal mostly benefits workers who graduate from low-reputation colleges, and allows workers to find jobs in more productive firms and in sectors that better use their skills. We rule out that the positive earnings returns are explained by human capital. The signal favors mostly less advantaged groups, implying that reducing information frictions about students' skills could potentially shrink earnings gaps. Our results imply that information policies like those that formally certify skills can improve the efficiency in talent allocation of the economy and, at the same time, level the playing field.
Flexibility and College Success: Evidence from a Reform at a Flagship University
College completion rates across countries remain low despite governmental efforts. Success in college depends on students' preparation and financial constraints, but it also depends on college quality and other supply-side factors. In this paper, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that increasing the flexibility of academic activities at a selective university in Colombia negatively affected students' educational attainment. Specifically, students' probability of graduating within six years decreased by ten percentage points (32 percent), and dropout rates within 2 years increased by four percentage points (or 11 percent). Initial evidence suggests that these effects are driven by strong incentives faced by students to complete fewer classes per semester post-reform implementation.
Give Teachers a Break? Teacher Preparation Period and Student Outcomes
with Nathan Petek, Nolan Pope, and George Zuo
Abstract coming soon!